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Decision makers often face choices between smaller more immediate rewards and larger
more delayed rewards. For example, when foraging for food, animals must choose
between actions that have varying costs (e.g., effort, duration, energy expenditure) and
varying benefits (e.g., amount of food intake). The combination of these costs and benefits
determine what optimal behavior is. In the present study, we employ a foraging-style
task to study how humans make reward-based choices in response to the real-time
constraints of a dynamic environment. On each trial participants were presented with
two rewards that differed in magnitude and in the delay until their receipt. Because the
experiment was of a fixed duration, maximizing earnings required decision makers to
determine how to trade off the magnitude and the delay associated with the two rewards
on each trial. To evaluate the extent to which participants could adapt to the decision
environment, specific task characteristics were manipulated, including reward magnitudes
(Experiment 1) and the delay between trials (Experiment 2). Each of these manipulations
was designed to alter the pattern of choices made by an optimal decision maker.
Several findings are of note. First, different choice strategies were observed with the
manipulated environmental constraints. Second, despite contextually-appropriate shifts in
behavior between conditions in each experiment, choice patterns deviated from theoretical
optimality. In particular, the delays associated with the rewards did not exert a consistent
influence on choices as required by exponential discounting. Third, decision makers
nevertheless performed surprisingly well in all task environments with any deviations from
strict optimality not having particularly deleterious effects on earnings. Taken together,
these results suggest that human decision makers are capable of exhibiting intertemporal
preferences that reflect a variety of environmental constraints.
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Decision makers often face intertemporal choices: choices
between actions associated with consequences that will be deliv-
ered at varying times in the future. For instance, many species
often face the choice of consuming food immediately or caching
it for future consumption. One central finding in the intertem-
poral choice literature is that both humans and other animals
discount the value of rewards as a function of the delay until
their delivery (e.g., Rachlin et al., 1991; Myerson et al., 2003; for
reviews, see Frederick et al., 2002; Luhmann, 2009). In human
intertemporal choice experiments, preferences are most often
elicited by offering two rewards (usually monetary rewards),
each associated with a different delay (e.g., $10 today or $25
in 3 months). After participants make a relatively large set of
these intertemporal choices, experimenters typically estimate a
discount function which represents the subjective value of future
rewards (as a function of delay) for each individual decision
maker.
The literature concerning intertemporal choice has been over-
whelmingly concerned with the nature of the discount func-
tion that best describes discounting. One suggestion has been
the exponential function, which is based on the continuously
compounded utility function first proposed by Samuelson (1937).
Exponential discounting can be formalized as follows:
VD = V0
ekD
(1)
where VD is the discounted value of the delayed reward, V0 is the
undiscounted value of the delayed reward (i.e., its objective mag-
nitude), k is the discount rate that measures how quickly reward
loses subjective value as a function of delay, and D is the length
of delay until the reward’s receipt. The exponential function is
normatively attractive because it obeys the stationarity axiom
(Koopmans, 1960). That is, when choosing between two rewards,
the difference between the two delays will affect preferences, but
a constant delay added to both rewards will not. This property
also ensures dynamically consistent preferences (Strotz, 1955); if
a decision maker prefers Reward1 to be delivered at Time1 over
Reward2 to be delivered at Time2, this decision maker will never
come to prefer Reward2 as time passes.
In contrast, empirical data from both humans (e.g., Myerson
and Green, 1995; Kirby, 1997; Madden et al., 2003; but see
Luhmann, 2013) and other animals (e.g., Rodriguez and Logue,
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1988; Mazur, 2007) have led researchers to prefer the following
hyperbolic function (Mazur, 1984, 1987):
VD = V0
1+ kD (2)
where the parameters are the same those as defined in Equation 1.
One property of this hyperbolic model is that regardless of the
delay associated with a reward, each additional period of delay
diminishes the discounted value by a smaller proportion (i.e., a
diminishing decay rate). As a result, the preferences of a hyper-
bolic discounter are expected to change as the delay until a
reward’s receipt elapses (e.g., Thaler, 1981; Kirby and Herrnstein,
1995).
FORAGING-STYLE PARADIGMS
The study of human intertemporal choice has largely been driven
by theories and empirical techniques derived from economics.
For example, the intense focus on the descriptive accuracy of
exponential and hyperbolic discounting functions is largely due
to the conflict between economic prescriptions and empirical
observations. Similarly, temporal preferences themselves tend
to be evaluated using techniques (i.e., choices between pairs
of delayed rewards) that are standard in economics. The over-
whelming reliance on these types of decisions has not gone
without critique (e.g., Hastie, 2001; Fawcett et al., 2012). A major
theme in these critiques is a concern about how ecologically
relevant these tasks are, because many real-world intertempo-
ral dilemmas arise in dynamic environments where repeated,
interdependent decisions are required to accomplish ultimate
goals. Another potential limitation of most intertemporal choice
tasks is that the costs associated with a choice (e.g., delay) are
often minimally experienced by the participant. As a result, some
researchers have developed experiential decision-making tasks
(e.g., Herrnstein et al., 1993; Reynolds and Schiffbauer, 2004;
Gureckis and Love, 2009; Luhmann et al., 2011) with the explicit
goal of measuring temporal preferences in the face of actualized
consequences.
Another reason to look for more naturalistic methods of
studying intertemporal choice is because humans are not the
only organisms that face intertemporal tradeoffs. Intertemporal
tradeoffs are ubiquitous in natural environments, and are partic-
ularly evident in foraging decisions such as prey selection and
patch exploitation/exploration. Optimal foraging theory (Pyke
et al., 1977; Pyke, 1984; Stephens and Krebs, 1986) is a framework
within behavioral ecology that characterizes foraging decisions as
maximizing some currency (e.g., net energy gain or evolution-
ary fitness). Of particular interest within this framework has been
the patch exploitation problem. In this scenario, foragers reside
within a resource patch (e.g., a specific field of flowers) consum-
ing the resources therein and thus depleting the patch as residence
time increases. The exploitation problem refers to a persistent
dilemma in which the forager must either stay within the current,
ever less valuable patch or switch to a new resource patch that may
or may not contain more resources. Intertemporal tradeoffs arise
in these situations because there are a variety of delays affecting
optimal behavior, including the travel time between patches, the
average search time upon entering a patch and encountering a
reward, and the handling time that elapses between encountering
and experiencing a reward.
Studying decision making in more naturalistic environments
is also important because doing so has the ability to reveal
complexities in animal decision processes (including temporal
preferences) that might differ from behavior observed in more
contrived (e.g., laboratory) situations. For example, the study of
non-human intertemporal choices are typically evaluated using
an operant self-control paradigm, in which trials consist of a
smaller-sooner reward (e.g., 1 pellet of food in 2 s) and a larger-
later reward (e.g., 8 pellets of food in 10 s) being presented to the
decision maker with the delay that follows each trial adjusted so
that the total duration of a trial is the same regardless of which
reward is chosen. The differences in temporal choice behavior
between these self-control environments and foraging environ-
ments can be striking. For example, the behavior of pigeons (and
other non-human animals) in such tasks has suggested that the
subjective value of rewards drop 50% when delayed by just a
few seconds (e.g., Green et al., 2004). In contrast, Stevens and
Stephens (2008) describe how Clark’s nutcracker birds routinely
cache upwards of 30,000 seeds every autumn as insurance against
the scarcity of subsequent winter months!
Patch exploitation tasks have only recently been used out-
side of ecology (see Sugrue et al., 2004; Adams et al., 2013).
For instance, Hayden et al. (2011) had rhesus monkeys per-
form a virtual foraging task where choices were between a “stay”
option which was analogous to the decision maker continuing to
deplete a reward patch and a “switch” option which was analo-
gous to the decision maker leaving the patch. Results indicated
that certain behaviors of the rhesus monkeys conformed to pre-
dictions of optimal foraging models (the marginal value theorem
specifically, Charnov, 1976). For example, as the length of the
delay following a switch choice (i.e., travel time) increased, the
monkeys chose the stay option more often (indicating longer
patch residence time). This pattern is consistent with optimal
foraging theory because these delays are analogous to travel
times in natural environments (i.e., they represent the delay that
elapses between switch choices and the next opportunity to earn
rewards). Because rewards cannot be earned during these delays,
they can be thought of as opportunity costs; the longer the delay,
the more costly it is.
Adoption of patch exploitation paradigms has been even less
common in the study of human intertemporal preferences (for
recent exceptions, see Hutchinson et al., 2008; Kolling et al.,
2012). What have become increasingly common in this field
are tasks that incorporate critical aspects of traditional foraging
paradigms. For example, there has been a recent surge of stud-
ies employing tasks in which choices influence both immediate
rewards and the magnitude and/or availability of future rewards
(e.g., Herrnstein et al., 1993; Gureckis and Love, 2009; Stillwell
and Tunney, 2009; Otto et al., 2010). Other work has instead
focused on choices made under time constraints. For example,
Schweighofer et al. (2006) developed a repeated-choice task in
which two reward items were presented on the screen on each
trial (corresponding to a smaller sooner reward and a larger later
reward). These items differed both in their magnitude and in the
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amount of time required to earn each reward. The entire task had
a fixed time limit, which created a tradeoff between the magni-
tudes of the rewards available on each trial and the amount of
time required to earn those rewards. As a result, participants were
required to figure out the optimal strategy in order to maximize
earnings. Schweighofer et al. (2006) found that human choices
approximated optimality. Specifically, results suggested that par-
ticipants did not discount rewards hyperbolically and instead
behaved in a manner that closely approached exponential dis-
counting. Given that standard intertemporal choice tasks have
found that humans consistently discount hyperbolically, these
results suggest that more naturalistic decision contexts can pro-
duce rational behavior in human decision makers (cf. Luhmann,
2013).
The goal of the present experiments was to further test the
ability of human decision makers to make adaptive choices in
foraging-style environments. The task developed by Schweighofer
et al. (2006) was employed and various choice-relevant task
parameters were manipulated. Specifically, to evaluate the extent
to which participants could adapt to the decision environment,
both rewardmagnitude (Experiment 1) and the delay between tri-
als (Experiment 2) were manipulated. These manipulations were
selected because optimal decision makers should respond to both
manipulations by modulating their relative preferences for the
larger, more delayed reward.
EXPERIMENT 1
METHOD
Participants
Forty-eight Stony Brook University undergraduates participated
in exchange for partial course credit. One participant failed to
sample one of the two choices and was thus excluded from further
analyses. This left data from 47 participants in all of the fol-
lowing analyses. Twenty-three participants were included in the
Large-Reward condition and 24 participants were included in the
Small-Reward condition. The experiment was approved by the
Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects (CORIHS) at
Stony Brook University. Informed consent was obtained from all
participants.
Materials and procedure
Task. A variation of the task used in the current experiments has
been used and described before (e.g., Schweighofer et al., 2006,
2008; Tanaka et al., 2007). The task consisted of five blocks of tri-
als, with each block lasting 210 s.1 On each trial, two reward items
were presented on the screen (see Figure 1). Each reward item
was represented by a 32× 32 grid (1024 cells). One grid was blue
and white (the smaller reward, RS) whereas the other grid was
orange and white (the larger reward, RL). The number of white
cells within the blue and orange grids represented the amount of
time required to acquire the smaller reward (DS) and the larger
reward (DL), respectively. The maximum delay employed in the
1Participants were also run in five practice blocks. After receiving instructions,
participants were run in the first block of practice trials. If participants did not
have any questions about the task, they were then run in four more blocks of
practice trials to make sure they were familiar with the task.
FIGURE 1 | An example trial in the experimental task. On each trial,
participants chose between an orange (the large reward) and blue (the
small reward) grid. The number of filled cells in each grid represented the
length of delay until that reward’s delivery. A response signal (a fixation
cross) appeared on the screen 500ms after the reward pair was presented
(the preview window), and remained on the screen for a minimum of 1 s
(the response window) or until a participant made a response. Choices
were made by pressing the left or right arrow key. On each step of a trial,
choosing a reward filled an additional 1.5 s-worth of delay in that reward’s
grid. Once one of the grids was filled completely, the reward earned was
displayed along with the total, accumulated rewards for the current block.
The next trial began after the ITI, which was 1.5 s for both conditions in
Experiment 1, 1 s for the Short-ITI condition in Experiment 2, and 6 s for the
Long-ITI condition in Experiment 2. The reward magnitude for the large
reward in this example illustrates the Small-Reward condition in Experiment
1. For the Large-Reward condition in Experiment 1 this magnitude was 24
points, and for both conditions in Experiment 2 it was 20 points.
task was 13 s, and was represented by a grid with 37 filled cells
(4% of the grid). The minimum delay employed in the task was
0 s, and was represented by a grid with 987 filled cells (96% of the
grid).
There were two between-subjects conditions, the Large-
Reward condition and the Small-Reward condition. The values of
RS and RL for the Large-Reward condition were 5 and 24 points,
and for the Small-Reward condition they were 5 and 12 points.
The values for all other task variables were the same between the
two conditions. At the beginning of each trial, the smaller reward
was associated with a new delay DS (ranging from 1 to 6 s) and
the larger reward was associated with a new delay DL (ranging
from 5 to 13 s). In order to acquire one of these rewards, par-
ticipants had to repeatedly select a reward item over a series of
steps until all the cells inside one of the two grids were filled.
When one of the two reward items was chosen at each step in
www.frontiersin.org June 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 93 | 3
Bixter and Luhmann Adaptive decision making
the trial, several unfilled cells within that reward item’s grid were
filled whereas the non-chosen reward item’s grid remained the
same. Specifically, 146 cells (14% of the grid) were filled after a
choice, which corresponded to 1.5 s of delay (i.e., the length of a
single step, see below) being subtracted from that reward item’s
total delay.
At the beginning of each step the newly revised delays were
presented for 500ms (the preview window), during which partic-
ipants could not respond. A fixation cross then appeared at the
center of the screen which signaled that participants could make
their choice. This fixation cross remained on the screen for at least
1 s (the response window) or, in the event that no response was
made within 1 s, until participants made a choice. Choices were
made by pressing the left or right arrow key on the computer
keyboard. The combination of the preview window and response
window represented the 1.5 s step inter-stimulus-interval (Step-
ISI) that occurred after a choice at each step. In order to increase
attention toward the task, whether a reward item was presented
on the left or right side of the screen was randomized at each step.
Once one of the two rewards was earned, a 1.5 s inter-trial interval
(ITI) occurred. During the ITI, the reward earned on the previous
trial was displayed along with the total, accumulated rewards for
the block displayed right below it.
Because the overall time limit associated with each block was
critical, a clock-like figure was included at the top of the computer
screen which represented how much time was left in the current
block. This clock was present at all times throughout the task and
the hand on the clock made one complete counter-clockwise rev-
olution over the course of the block. Once this hand completed
its revolution, participants completed the trial they were on and
the block ended. After the completion of each block, participants
were presented their total reward earnings for the block and told
that they could press the spacebar to begin the next block of
trials.
Choice analysis. Because themagnitudes of the larger and smaller
rewards were fixed across the experiment, we formalized partici-
pants’ choices as a function of the two delays presented on each
trial. Specifically, Schweighofer et al. (2006) demonstrated ana-
lytically that optimal behavior in this task involved choosing the
larger reward, P(L), with a probability proportional to
−aLDL + DS + aC (3)
where DS and DL are the delays associated with the smaller and
larger rewards, respectively, on a given trial. This choice rule is
analogous to assuming that the space of possible delay pairs (DS,
DL) is bisected by an indifference line with slope
1
aL
. If we defineω
to be 11+aL and γ to be aC (1−ω), Equation 3 suggests that choices
should also be proportional to:
γ+ (1−ω)DS − ωDL (4)
In this expression, it is more obvious that choices can be
conceptualized as a function of a constant term, γ, and a
weighted combination of the shorter and longer delays. Under
Equation 4, the slope of the indifference line is 1−ω
ω
. Thus,
ω = 0.5 corresponds to exponential discounting because prefer-
ences would only be sensitive to the difference between DL and
DS, thus obeying the axiom of stationarity (Koopmans, 1960).
On a more intuitive level, when ω is 0.5, the decision maker is
placing equal weight on both delays, whereas deviations from
0.5 indicate that the decision maker is placing more weight
on DL (ω > 0.5) or DS (ω < 0.5). Schweighofer et al. (2006)
found that humans in this task produced an average ω of 0.476,
which closely approximates normatively preferred, exponential
discounting.
Participants’ preferences were characterized by fitting the fol-
lowing logistic regression model to participants’ choices:
P(L) = 1
1+ e[−ρ·[γ+ (1−ω)DS −ωDL]] (5)
where ρ is a stochasticity parameter that controls how determinis-
tic a participant’s choices are. Equation 5 was fitted separately for
each individual participant by finding values for ρ, γ, and ω that
maximized the likelihood of that participant’s observed data. The
only choice in a given trial that was used in all data analyses was
the final choice of the trial sequence (i.e., the choice that led to one
of the two reward items being received). Because it took multiple
choices for a reward to be received on a given trial, it was possible
that a participant’s final choice in a trial did not match her initial
choice at the beginning of the trial. However, for both conditions
in both experiments, the proportion of trials where such rever-
sals occurred was extremely small. For instance, in Experiment 1
it was less than 4% in both conditions, and in Experiment 2 it was
less than 3% in both conditions.
Because the above choice rule bisects the choice space into
two regions (i.e., the region in which the larger reward is pre-
ferred and the region in which the smaller reward is preferred),
we were also able to compute an area-under-the-curve (AUC)
measure. Specifically, AUCwas the proportion of the space of pos-
sible DL/DS pairs that would be expected to yield choices for the
larger, delayed reward given the estimated choice parameters for
that participant. Thus, these AUC values represented a relatively
theory-agnostic measure of participants’ preferences for the larger
later rewards and allowed us tomore directly evaluate whether the
experimental manipulations had their predicted effects.
In order to find the values of γ and ω that would maximize
earnings in each of the different conditions of Experiments 1 and
2 (i.e., the optimal parameter values), a search of the parameter
space was performed with 5000 iterations of the task (as described
in Table 1) being run to compute the expected earnings of each
parameter pair. On each trial deterministic choices were made
according to Equation 5 (i.e., choosing the larger reward when
this quantity was positive, choosing the smaller reward when this
quantity was negative). An initial grid search explored all integer
values of γ between 2 and 10 andωwas allowed to vary between 0
and 1 in increments of 0.1. Values for γ and ω that jointly yielded
the maximal payoffs were then used as the starting point for a
second more granular search of the parameter space (using the
Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm). The values for γ and ω pro-
duced by this procedure that maximized overall earnings within
each condition were taken as optimal.
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Table 1 | Values for reward, delay, and ITI variables in Experiment 1
and Experiment 2.
Variable Experiment 1 Experiment 2
RS 5 5
RL 12 or 24 20
DS 1–6 s 1–6 s
DL 5–13 s 5–13 s
Step-ISI 1.5 s 1.5 s
ITI 1.5 s 1 or 6 s
Block length 210 s 210 s
Note: See text for definitions of each variable. Values in bold represent the two
conditions in each experiment.
FIGURE 2 | Choices from illustrative participants in the Small-Reward
(left) and Large-Reward (right) conditions in Experiment 1. For the
participant in the Small-Reward condition (participant #39), the best-fitting
parameter estimates were γ = 2.73 and ω = 0.63. For the participant in the
Large-Reward condition (participant #40), these estimates were γ = 6.53
and ω = 0.75.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The main goal of Experiment 1 was to see whether decision
makers were capable of modulating their intertemporal pref-
erences in response to a manipulation of reward magnitude
in a time-constrained environment. Specifically, participants in
the Large-Reward condition were expected to exhibit a stronger
preference for the larger reward than participants in the Small-
Reward condition. See Figure 2 for choices from an illustrative
participant in each condition. Equation 5 was fit to individ-
ual participants’ choices and AUC was computed as a measure
of intertemporal preferences (see Method section for details).
As Figure 3A displays, participants in the Large-Reward condi-
tion had a higher AUC (M = 0.53, SE = 0.04) than participants
in the Small-Reward condition (M = 0.40, SE = 0.04) [t(45) =
2.58, p < 0.05]. This means that the manipulation had the pre-
dicted effect; increasing the difference between the magnitudes of
the two rewards resulted in a stronger preference for the larger
reward.
We next wanted to see how participants’ choices in the
two conditions were related to the choices of an optimal deci-
sion maker. For the Large-Reward and Small-Reward conditions,
respectively, the optimal values for γ were estimated to be 4.10
and 2.98 and for ω they were both estimated to be 0.5. Observed
parameter values for participants in the Large-Reward condition
(median γ = 5.08, SE = 0.43; medianω = 0.64, SE = 0.04) and
participants in the Small-Reward condition (median γ = 4.81,
SE = 0.42;medianω = 0.69, SE = 0.03) deviated from the above
optimal values. The most critical deviation from optimality was
that participants did not weigh DS and DL equally (i.e., have a ω
parameter of 0.5). Having ω values greater than 0.5 means par-
ticipants were over-weighing DL and under-weighing DS (see the
General Discussion for further discussion).
In order to determine how these deviations from optimality
affected participants’ performance in the task, we investigated
the relationship between participants’ expected earnings and the
optimal earnings (see Method section for how optimal earnings
were calculated). Calculating the expected earnings for an indi-
vidual participant was found by using that participant’s γ and
ω estimates (i.e., the participant’s choice rule) and used them
in 5000 simulated runs of the experiment (assuming determin-
istic choices). As can be seen in Figure 3B, participants’ expected
earnings in both conditions were high in relation to optimal earn-
ings. Participants in the Large-Reward condition were expected to
earn 92.84% of the optimal earnings (SE = 1.30), whereas those
in the Small-Reward condition were expected to earn 95.60%
of the optimal earnings (SE = 0.78). The difference between the
two conditions was marginally significant [t(36.133) = 1.818, p =
0.077, corrected df due to unequal variances], indicating that
participants’ choices in the Small-Reward condition were earn-
ing slightly closer to optimal levels than participants’ choices in
the Large-Reward condition. However, participants in both con-
ditions performed surprisingly well. Taken together, the details
of participants’ choice rules clearly deviated from optimality
(i.e., they failed to place equal weight on each delay as expected
under exponential discounting), but these deviations did not have
particularly deleterious effects on earnings.
EXPERIMENT 2
According to optimal foraging theory (specifically, the marginal
value theorem, Charnov, 1976), choices in the patch exploitation
paradigm should be directly influenced by travel time between
patches. This is because longer travel times represent increased
opportunity costs, which lead foragers to increase their prefer-
ence for more fully depleting the current patch before switching
to a new patch. Support for this prediction has been found across
different species and foraging environments (e.g., Boivin et al.,
2004). In contrast, many studies employing more traditional, lab-
oratory intertemporal choice tasks have shown that the delay that
elapses after the delivery of a reward (i.e., ITIs) has little or no
influence on preferences (e.g., Mazur, 1989; Mazur and Romano,
1992; Bateson and Kacelnik, 1996).
Why the discrepancy between the self-control and foraging
literatures? One explanation is that choices between mutually
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FIGURE 3 | Results from Experiment 1. (A) The higher AUC value in the
Large-Reward condition compared to the Small-Reward condition indicates
a greater preference for the larger, more delayed reward (i.e., the orange
grid). (B) The proportion of optimal earnings expected to be earned by
participants based on their individual choice rules. Participants in both
conditions were close to optimal, with participants in the Small-Reward
condition having a marginally higher proportion than participants in the
Large-Reward condition.
exclusive rewards in traditional laboratory intertemporal tasks
and the sequential stay/switch choices common to patchy forag-
ing environments are fundamentally different sorts of decisions
(Stephens et al., 2004; Stephens, 2008; Stephens and Dunlap,
2009, 2011; Bourgeois-Gironde, 2012). For example, decision
makers may view ITIs in traditional laboratory intertemporal
choice tasks as irrelevant to reward earnings because all trials and
rewards are independent (Pearson et al., 2010). In contrast, longer
ITIs in sequential foraging situations (e.g., travel time) directly
affect patch staying/switching decisions because of the opportu-
nity costs they entail. That is, stay decisions allow the forager
to continue to accrue rewards whereas switch decisions immedi-
ately halt the accrual of rewards (until travel to a new patch is
complete) (Stephens and Anderson, 2001; Stephens and McLinn,
2003).
The goal of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether manip-
ulation of the ITI duration in the current task might modulate
participants’ preferences. To get a sense of how such manipula-
tions should affect choices in this task, imagine that a participant
has some criterion which approximates the maximal value of DL
that a participant will tolerate in order to choose the larger reward
on a given trial. Increasing the ITI should systematically increase
this criterion. Why? Because selecting the smaller reward in order
to advance to the next trial more quickly has now become a less
valuable strategy. Opting for the smaller reward does end the cur-
rent trial more quickly, but the decision maker must now face the
cost of the longer ITI (e.g., reducing the amount of time left in
the time-constrained task to earn future rewards) before being
offered the next pair of rewards.
Experiment 2 seeks to test this prediction. Doing so will
further evaluate the ability of humans to adapt to environ-
mental constraints, because the delay that elapses between trials
is likely a less salient facet of the task than the manipula-
tions of reward magnitude performed in Experiment 1. Of
course, because these factors are manipulated between-subjects,
it is not possible for participants to compare the task envi-
ronments. That being said, because of the intuitive relation-
ship between reward magnitude and long-term earnings, the
saliency (and relevance) of our reward manipulation may have
been greater than the saliency of our ITI manipulation. As a
result, Experiment 2 served as a stronger test of decision mak-
ers’ sensitivity to the constraints created by a dynamic choice
environment.
METHOD
Participants
A new sample of 26 Stony Brook University undergraduates par-
ticipated in exchange for partial course credit. Data from one
participant was excluded because the participant was only run in
one block of practice trials (as opposed to five). However, includ-
ing this participant’s data did not alter any of the patterns or levels
of significance of the following results. This left 13 participants
in the Long-ITI condition and 12 participants in the Short-
ITI condition. The experiment was approved by the CORIHS at
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Stony Brook University. Informed consent was obtained from all
participants.
Materials and procedure
The materials and procedure in Experiment 2 were the same as in
Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. Because we were no
longer interested in the effect of rewardmagnitude on choices, the
reward amounts for the small and large rewards were fixed at five
and 20 points, respectively, regardless of condition. However, the
ITI that elapsed between the completion of one trial (i.e., the fill-
ing of one of the two grids) and the beginning of the next trial was
systematically manipulated between conditions. For the Short-ITI
and Long-ITI condition, the length of time that elapsed between
trials was 1 s and 6 s, respectively.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
See Figure 4 for choices from an illustrative participant in each
condition. Similar to Experiment 1, Equation 5 was fit to partic-
ipants’ choices (see Experiment 1 Method section for details). As
Figure 5A displays, it was found that participants in the Long-
ITI condition had a higher AUC (M = 0.67, SE = 0.09) than
participants in the Short-ITI condition (M = 0.46, SE = 0.03)
[t(14.209) = 2.334, p < 0.05, corrected df due to unequal vari-
ances]. This means that themanipulation had the predicted effect;
increasing the ITI resulted in a stronger preference for the larger
reward. So whereas it has been found that manipulations of ITI
have little or no influence on intertemporal preferences in tra-
ditional laboratory self-control paradigms (e.g., Mazur, 1989;
Bateson and Kacelnik, 1996), the current experiment shows that
ITIs can have an influence on preferences when time-constraints
are in place.
We again wanted to see how participants’ choices in the two
conditions related to the choices of an optimal decision maker.
For the Long-ITI and Short-ITI conditions, respectively, the
FIGURE 4 | Choices from illustrative participants in the Short-ITI (left)
and Long-ITI (right) conditions in Experiment 2. For the participant in the
Short-ITI condition (participant #15), the best-fitting parameter estimates
were γ = 4.02 and ω = 0.67. For the participant in the Long-ITI condition
(participant #10), these estimates were γ = 5.71 and ω = 0.69.
optimal values for γ were estimated to be 7.00 and 3.92 and
for ω they were both estimated to be 0.5. Observed values for
participants in the Long-ITI condition (median γ = 6.45, SE =
12.86; medianω = 0.68, SE = 0.31) 2 and participants in the
Short-ITI condition (median γ = 4.60, SE = 0.56; medianω =
0.67, SE = 0.05) deviated from the above optimal values. Once
again, the most critical deviation from optimality was that partic-
ipants did not weigh DS and DL equally (i.e., have a ω parameter
of 0.5). Similar to Experiment 1, we investigated the relationship
between participants’ expected earnings and optimal earnings. In
order to calculate the expected earnings for an individual par-
ticipant, we used that participant’s γ and ω estimates (i.e., the
participant’s choice rule) and used them in 5000 simulated runs
of the experiment (assuming deterministic choices). As can be
seen in Figure 5B, participants’ expected earnings in both condi-
tions were high in relation to optimal earnings. Participants in the
Long-ITI condition were expected to earn 92.22% of the optimal
earnings (SE = 2.78), whereas those in the Short-ITI condition
were expected to earn 94.80 % of optimal earnings (SE = 1.12).
The difference between the two conditions was not significant
[t(15.747) < 1, p > 0.40, corrected df due to unequal variances].
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Most real-world decisions occur in dynamic environments where
repeated choices are required to achieve long-term goals. Studying
the ability of humans to adapt to various constraints in these
types of environments can reveal elements of human decision
making that are potentially more difficult to capture in stan-
dard intertemporal choice tasks. In the current study, each trial
offered two reward items which differed both in their magnitude
and in the amount of time required to earn them. Importantly,
because the task had a fixed time limit, there existed a task-specific
choice strategy that maximized reward earnings. Choice-relevant
task parameters were manipulated in ways expected to influ-
ence the choice patterns of an optimal decision maker. These
manipulations included expanding the difference in magnitude
between the two rewards (Experiment 1) and increasing the delay
between trials (Experiment 2). In each of these cases, the manip-
ulations resulted in systematically different choice strategies and
these differences were in the predicted directions. Taken together,
these results suggest that participants are sensitive to environ-
mental constraints and are capable of shifting their intertemporal
preferences accordingly.
The current results further demonstrate the need to study
intertemporal decision making using a variety of methodologies.
As mentioned above, a predominant emphasis in the intertempo-
ral choice literature has been on the pervasive “sub-optimality” of
human and non-human decision making. For example, in labo-
ratory self-control tasks where short- and long-term rewards are
in conflict, it has been found that preferences are (1) dynami-
cally inconsistent and (2) oftentimes “pathologically” impatient
(Herrnstein and Prelec, 1991), meaning that the inability to delay
2One participant’s data in the Long-ITI condition was not well fit by the
model. Without this participant, the Long-ITI condition has a standard error
of 1.21 for the γ parameter and 0.08 for the ω parameter. Excluding this
participant’s data did not alter any of the reported results.
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FIGURE 5 | Results from Experiment 2. (A) The higher AUC value in the
Long-ITI condition compared to the Short-ITI condition represents a greater
preference for the larger, more delayed reward (i.e., the orange grid). (B) The
proportion of optimal earnings expected to be earned by participants based
on their individual choice rules. Participants in both conditions were close to
optimal, with no differences observed between conditions.
gratification is detrimental to long-term welfare (e.g., Hausman,
1979; Herrnstein et al., 1993). Here we have used a foraging-
style task in order to explore how human decision makers
adapt their choice preferences under real-time constraints. The
results of the current study as well as those of Schweighofer
et al. (2006) demonstrate that human decision makers are able
to adopt appropriate choice strategies, at least under certain
circumstances.
Even though our participants’ choices allowed them to earn
a large percentage of the total rewards possible, there were sys-
tematic deviations from strict optimality that need to be noted.
The most interesting of these is that, in all conditions in both
experiments, participants putmore weight on the delay associated
with the larger reward (DL) than on the delay associated with the
smaller reward (DS). This is an obvious deviation from the opti-
mal pattern in which each of the two delays is given equal weight.
One explanation for this deviation may be the fact that there was
greater variability in DL across trials. As a result, participants may
have paid greater attention to this dimension and relatively less
attention to the less variable DS. Alternatively, because DL was
associated with a larger, more desirable reward, participants may
have focused on the delay that would be required to receive it
to the relative exclusion of the delay associated with the smaller
reward.
A more provocative explanation is that our subjects may not
have been discounting the delayed rewards at all. For exam-
ple, Scholten and Read (2010) have argued that many of the
apparent deviations from economically normative standards (e.g.,
hyperbolic discounting) are not due to the shape of decision mak-
ers’ discount functions, but actually a product of attribute-based
intertemporal choices. That is, Scholten and Read (2010) suggest
that a decision maker faced with a standard intertemporal choice
(e.g., $10 in 4 days vs. $20 in 8 days) considers the difference
between the reward magnitudes and the difference between the
two delays. The ultimate decision about which delayed reward
to select is then a function of a comparison between these two
differences. Critical for the current results, Scholten and Read
allow for the reward magnitudes, the delays, and the differences
to be transformed and weighted. Thus, the over-weighing of DL
can be readily accounted for by their framework. This does not
rationalize the over-weighing of DL by participants in the current
study—the attribute model is intended to be descriptive rather
than normative—however it does provide a psychologically plau-
sible account for intertemporal anomalies such as those observed
in the current experiments.
Even though the task used in the current study simulates cer-
tain aspects of foraging environments, there are certain aspects
that differ from most naturalistic patch decisions. For instance,
in the current task, participants encounter two “patches” on each
trial, even though patches are usually thought to be encountered
sequentially. To more accurately simulate patchy environments,
patches could be presented sequentially with reward intake being
an increasing but decelerating function of patch residence time. In
these more realistic situations, the duration of time participants
spend in a patch should still be influenced by reward magni-
tude and ITI as in the current experiments. This prediction has
been tested by Hayden et al. (2011) who did find that rhesus
monkeys were sensitive to these sorts of manipulations. Research
is needed to see if patch exploitation/exploration decisions in
humans also conform to these predictions when making choices
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in resource-depleting patches. However, there are certain foraging
situations, especially central place foraging situations (Houston
and McNamara, 1985), where foragers leave a patch upon obtain-
ing a single-item reward (e.g., diving seals returning to the surface
after successfully obtaining a single prey item). The current task
can be seen as a variation of this single-item reward situation,
because each trial asked participants to select between “patches,”
each of which led to a single-item reward and an associated
interval of delay following the receipt of each reward.
The task used in the current experiments also deviated from
natural foraging environments in that all rewards were deliv-
ered without any risk or uncertainty. This obviously conflicts
with natural foraging environments where rewards are stochas-
tic and uncertain (McNamara, 1982; Stephens and Krebs, 1986,
Chapter 6; Nishimura, 1992; Kacelnik and Bateson, 1996, 1997;
McDermott et al., 2008). Foraging risks can include predation
risks, conspecific risks (e.g., food theft), and other collection
risks which prevent the receipt of a reward over delay. To fur-
ther increase ecological validity, foraging-style tasks with humans
should go on to add risk constraints which have shown to influ-
ence foraging preferences in non-human animals, such as vari-
ance in the travel time (i.e., ITI) between patches (e.g., Kacelnik
and Todd, 1992). Carrascal and Moreno (1993) found that the
addition of risk (through greater presence of conspecifics) led to
more immediate consumption and less caching in Nuthatch birds
during foraging. The human intertemporal choice literature has
also generally found that adding risk to larger, delayed rewards
tends to shift preferences toward more immediate rewards (e.g.,
Mischel and Grusec, 1967; Keren and Roelofsma, 1995). However,
it would be useful for future research to investigate how human
decision makers respond to risk in foraging-style tasks that
include intertemporal tradeoffs.
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